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THE ECONOMY OF PROPERTY FORMS
Abstract

This essay explores a puzzle from the world of property theory, that is from the world of mine and yours, the
basic social organizational molecules with which we build our sense of justice. The puzzle is this: why is there
so little variety in the forms of property people use across the world? We lack a convincing theory for the
"economy of property forms," where economy is understood in the sense of parsimony. Three partial answers
have been suggested. First, the limited number of forms may keep people from wasting property through overfragmentation. Second, the limit may economize on communication costs for third parties who want to buy or
sell property. Third, the limit may be an inexpensive way to help verify ownership. But none of these theories
accounts for why obsolete forms persist in many economies, and why value-increasing forms fail to be created.
Perhaps a more satisfying answer will require looking to political economy and to cognitive psychology. For
now, the economy of property forms remains a provocative question.
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I. INTRODUCTION

I want to pose a puzzle from the world of property theory, that is
from the world of mine and yours, the basic social organizational
molecules with which we build our sense of justice. The puzzle is this:
why is there so little variety in the forms of property people use across
the world?
For economists and many lawyers, the problem I am posing is
invisible. We typically talk about property in the sense of entitlements,
some of which may be ratified through legally cognizable forms, but
others exist informally. In this vision, property is not something fixed,
but rather understood relationally, as a fluid set of rights, duties, powers,
privileges, in other words we all now follow the 20th century language of
property as a shifting bundle of rights. An infinite number of property
forms could be cognizable, and as society becomes more complex, one
might expect more forms to emerge. For example, in a draft paper,
Harold Demsetz, a leading economist of property rights argues,
[T]he more extensive specialization becomes, the greater is the
variety of private property rights that is needed to accommodate
differing production and exchange conditions. The development of
private property rights . . . [has] mainly been a response to increased
gains from specialization of production.1

Indeed we do see more and more comprehensive resource governance
though private property systems – in the post-socialist world, in
securities markets, in cyberspace. However, what we do not see with
increased specialization, and perhaps contrary to the basic understanding
of property as a bundle of rights, is any greater variety in core private
property forms.
Bernard Rudden, from Oxford, introduced this problem in an
overlooked 1985 paper when he wrote that “the current literature offers
no economic explanation of the numerus clausus (that is, the limited
number of allowable property forms), but seems largely to ignore its
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existence.”2 Or as phrased in a draft article by Henry Hansmann and
Reinier Kraakman, why does “property law both define a set of wellrecognized standard forms that property rights can take, and burden the
creation of property rights that deviate from those standard forms.”3 We
lack a convincing theory of what I call the “economy of property forms,”
where the term economy is understood in the sense of parsimony. First,
I will briefly trace the intellectual development of the problem since
Rudden.4
II. ANTI-FRAGMENTATION, COMMUNICATION,
AND VERIFICATION ANSWERS
A. Anti-Fragmentation. I took a preliminary kick at the problem
a few years back in work that built on my theory of anticommons
property. The idea of anticommons property is straightforward. We have
long noted the possibility of a tragedy of the commons, in which people
waste a resource through overuse when too many may use a resource.
Indeed, the image of tragedy forms one of the standard explanations for
why we create private property in the first instance, as a mechanism for
conservation. The idea of anticommons property focuses us on the
mirror tragedy, the possibility that people may waste a resource through
underuse when too many people can exclude the others. Anticommons
tragedy helps explain many real-world phenomena where governments
impose hidden costs by creating too many property rights. In my view,
the limits on existing property forms, what I called the boundary
principle, functions as a crude mechanism the law has evolved to limit
the social costs of excessive fragmentation.5
B. Communication. Tom Merrill and Henry Smith argued in an
article last year that my anti-fragmentation argument can not be
2
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sufficient, that law need not police fragmentation because buyers and
sellers who create new property forms would directly bear the costs of
those new forms. They counter with an communication-based argument
that focuses attention on costs external to sellers and buyers.6 They
argue there exists a point of optimal standardization, the numerus
clausus, because marginal frustration and measurement costs increase
with each new form, while marginal benefits decrease because a few
property forms suffice as building blocks for the complex transactions a
modern economy requires.
Recently, Hansmann and Kraakman countered Merrill and Smith.
The communication approach may help explain why there exist some
standard-form property rights, and why clarity matters, but it does not
explain why law limits creation of nonstandard forms. Additional types
do not reduce the communicative value of standard forms; rather, like
new words in a language, they generally increase our ability to speak
precisely or govern resources efficiently.
C. Verification. Hansmann and Kraakman propose focusing on
the institutional mechanisms that shape new forms, what they call
property law’s verification function. For them, verification is the
primary reason for the numerus clausus, indeed what most distinguishes
property from contract. Buyers need to verify whether sellers have the
power to sell more than they worry about the content of rights.
Transferability is the key, and the solution lies in a verification system
that establishes rules for determining who among competing claimants
will be awarded a right. Verification systems range from simple
possession, which allows easy identification of ownership but no divided
rights, to branding or labeling, to public registries that may costly to
administer and access but that can economically support numerous
property forms once they are established. Their theory asks us to look
more closely at verification institutions and to think about the third party
information dilemmas the they solve. And there stands the debate.
III. THE STRANGE ECONOMY OF PROPERTY FORMS
A. The Survivor Game . None of these theories answers the
problem of why we still have both too many and too few forms. Let’s
start with “too many.” If, as Hansmann and Kraakman suggest, having
obsolete forms continue in force does not impose additional
communication costs, and if some people continue to rely on the form,
6
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then there is no particular reason to be rid of any, once created. Once
you have to check the records to verify whether you are dealing with a
life estate or fee simple, the continued existence of some fee complicated
imposes no further cost. The numerus clausus seems a one way ratchet.
But since feudal times, many quaint forms have disappeared including
dower and curtesy, fee tails, incorporeal hereditaments such as
advowsons and corodies and so on.7 By the way, I would vote the fee
simple determinable off the island next, and there are a few more
survivors to boot out. Over the past 500 years, on net, the numerus
clausus has shrunk. None of our theories explains attrition in property
forms.
B. Of BLIDs and LADs . On the other side of the coin, there are
many missing forms. Some new forms have emerged, ranging from the
private trust to the limited liability corporation in organizational law; the
right of publicity, right of integrity, and misappropriation of information
in intellectual property. But these forms hardly seem to exhaust the field
of useful candidates. On the real property side, Robert Ellickson, a
numerus clausus entrepreneur writes,
[I]t is worth recalling that during the past half century the passage of
enabling acts sparked the rapid spread of two significant microterritorial institutions, namely, condominium associations and
Business Improvement Districts. Those precedents demonstrate that
spontaneous order has its limits. It appears that lawyers and
legislators – despite their plummeting reputations – at times can play
a constructive role in propagating fresh institutional arrangements.8

Bob Ellickson noticed a gap in property forms designed to solve a
particular intermediate-level collective action problems. New residential
communities can use homeowners’ associations; existing commercial
areas can create business improvement districts. But existing residential
city blocks or neighborhoods cannot retrofit themselves to provide local
public goods. Absent an off-the-rack property form, like Ellickson’s
proposed block-level improvement districts (BLIDs), homeowners are
walking past piles of $100 bills.
In a second example, my colleague Rick Hills and I are preparing
an article that considers the virtues of LADs, land assembly districts
designed to avoid another common, costly intermediate-level
7
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coordination failure. Now, land assemblers face laborious negotiations
and holdouts or they seek to commandeer local eminent domain power,
as in the Poletown case. A LAD would be a special purpose bargaining
unit, like unitization in oil and gas fields, that would create a community
counterpart able to negotiate a binding deal with the developer, would
allow the relevant micro-community to capture more neighborhood
consumer surplus than does the eminent domain alternative, would
reduce secondary rent-seeking, and would unlock the potential value
from larger plots. LADs address the waste from underuse of resources
that I call anticommons tragedy.9
C. The Liberal Commons Form . BLIDs and LADs, like condos
and limited liability companies before them, would fill a more general
gap in the numerus clausus, a lack of property forms that unlock value
trapped by otherwise intractable collective action problems when the
optimal scale of use changes. The gap spans group property settings
where the relevant resource is, as Carol Rose says, “private on the
outside, commons on the inside.”10 She calls this understudied area
“limited commons property,” Elinor Ostrom labels it, “common pool
resources.”11 I am advocating we call it a “liberal commons” because
each new property form in this arena must solve a recurring set of both
liberal and commons dilemmas to be admitted to the numerus clausus.12
To appeal to, and be accepted as legitimate by, owners of sole private
property, a new group property form must protect owners’ liberty and
autonomy concerns while offering them the social and economic gains
possible in a well-governed commons.

9
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IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS: QUESTIONING THE LANGUAGE OF PROPERTY
The liberal commons form circles me back to a question for this
conference. If you agree with the economists that a greater “variety of
private property rights is needed to accommodate differing production
and exchange conditions,” if you agree with the legal theorists that
“lawyers and legislators at times can play a constructive role in
propagating fresh institutional arrangements,” if you agree with me the
numerus clausus has too few group property forms, then what comes
next? How can people catalyze new property forms or in some cases
destroy old ones?
Perhaps the political economy of the numerus clausus matters as
much as the economy. New property forms do not spring into existence
unbidden because, as Carol and others have written, the same types of
collective action problems that stymie efficient resource deployment in
the private arena also operate in the political arena. Additionally,
psychological (or biological) explanations may help explain the property
form gap. People do not lobby for forms that create wealth they have not
yet seen, may not be able to capture, and cannot yet imagine. Just as it is
difficult for potential immigrants, future residents, to defend their
interests in city politics, it is hard for potential property forms to make
their virtues known.
All of these approaches bring us to a deeper set of questions at
the core of property theory, such as what really is property? How is
property different from contract, and what if anything turns on these
distinctions? Is our language of property out of date? How useful today
is the “bundle of rights” image, the “tragedy of the commons” metaphor,
the idea of private property as “sole and despotic dominion” or the
standard trilogy of ownership as private, commons, or state. All these
analytic tools have been enormously productive over the past few
generations, but perhaps now they serve to limit imagination and
innovation at the frontiers of property.
“Why do we have so few property forms” is a great question, one
I hope and expect will continue to produce exciting, provocative work.

